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Abstract A significant increase of concentration in the UK salmon retail subsector has 
heightened concerns about retail firms’ ability to exercise market power in the purchase of 
supplies  (oligopsony  power).  To  assess  the  extent  to  which  retail  firms  have  exercised 
oligopsony power, we develop a dynamic error correction translog profit function to model 
the behaviour of retailers in the input market for smoke, fillet and whole salmon. Initial 
estimates  indicated  violations  of  monotonicity and  convexity  conditions  as  implied  by
economic theory. In order to ameliorate the problem, a Bayesian technique was used to
impose inequality restrictions to correct the anomaly. The final estimated indices of market 
power in the models were low and statistically significant but sufficiently closer to the perfect 
competition benchmark to indicate that retailers as a whole behaved competitively during 
much of the period covered by this study.
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Introduction 
One of the most visible changes in the UK seafood marketing chain is that the supermarket 
rather than the fishmonger has become the outlet of choice for most salmon consumers.  The 
dominance of supermarket in the retail chain for food products, including seafood, has been 
exacerbated by mergers, acquisitions, consolidation (Clarke et al., 2002) and the declining 
number of fishmongers (Murray and Fofana, 2002). The consequence for seafood retailing in 
the UK today is  a high  level of concentration along the marketing chain.   Such parallel 
increase in concentration has raised significant concerns that large retailers may be able to 
exercise market power over their suppliers and thereby earn supernormal profits (Dobson et 
al.  2001).  This  market  power  that  retailers  or  buyers  in  general,  possess  vis-à-vis  their 
suppliers has been coined as “buyer power” in the literature.
The investigation  by the UK Competition Commission's (CC) (2000) of suppliers' relations 
with retailers indicated that lower wholesale prices in certain product categories had not been 
passed on to consumers. This was cited as evidence of the adverse impact on consumers of 
the large retailers' buying power. This is consistent with the predictions of economic theory 
which holds that retailers with buying power earn rent by restricting demand for goods at the 
upstream stage and paying suppliers a price less than that in a perfectly competitive market 
(e.g. Dobson et al. 2001). Under these circumstances suppliers find themselves worse-off 
since  they  receive  a  price  which  falls  below  the  perfectly  competitive  level.  It  is  also 
consistent with the CC’s argument that as gate keepers, retailers with buying power exercise 
the wherewithal to boycott some suppliers by switching to new suppliers at short notice to 
take advantage of a cheaper deal.  The main conclusion of the CC was that the large retail 
chains exercised sufficient buying power. In support of this conclusion, the CC identified 30 
business practices, which, if carried out, adversely affected the competitiveness of some of 
their suppliers and distorted competition in the supplier market.  In March 2006, the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) again signalled its plan to refer the market for the supply of groceries by 
retailers to the CC for more detailed investigation.  The main reason for the latest OFT's 
action was due to further consolidation in the retail market since 2000. OFT published its 
review of the market for consultation and took the decision in April 2006 to refer the supply 
of groceries by retailers in the UK to the CC for further investigation.   The OFT has not been 
alone  in  raising  alarm  regarding  the  increase  in  the  level  of  concentration  among  food 
retailers.  Academics  and  the  popular  press  have  also  raised  their  voices  regarding  the 
growing public concern with the spiralling power of the large retail chains (e.g. Blythman
2004, Dobson 2004, Lawrence 2004). Consumer groups and trade magazines in the salmon 
industry, in particular, have made strong claims that supermarket chains use their buying 
power to obtain substantial discounts from suppliers which they never pass on to consumers 
(e.g. Fish Farming Today, No. 180 November, 2003).  
There  are  few  empirical  studies  of  retailers'  behaviour  in  salmon  industry  in  the  UK. 
Researchers who have conducted studies on market power have tended to concentrate on the 
oligopoly. In applied industrial economic research, the estimation of market power or price 
conjectures depends crucially on demand and cost functions which are sufficiently flexible, 
allows  the  imposition  of  theoretical  restrictions,  and  allows  for  the  derivation  of  the 
appropriate functional form. Previous researches on market power for salmon have relied on 
restrictive single models (e.g. Steen et al. 1997, Jaffry et al. 2003) to derive market power 
measure.4
In this paper, we develop, in the tradition of the empirical industrial organisation literature, an 
econometric model of firm conduct with the view to measuring, explicitly, the degree of 
competitiveness of retailers’ dealings with their suppliers in the UK salmon market. While 
our model complements those based on the study of single products (e.g. Steen et al. 1997, 
Jaffry et al. 2003), it makes a departure in that it uses a translog profit function which allows 
for the study of several markets more efficiently. It also allowed the imposition of regularity 
conditions  as  implied  in  economic  theory  using  a  Bayesian  technique  as  enunciated  by 
Geweke (1986) and Poirier (1995). An important aspect of Bayesian approach which we have 
exploited in this paper is the ease with which it is possible to impose inequality constraints on 
the model when regularity conditions implied in economic theory are violated. Terrell (1996) 
Chalfant et al. (1991) and Geweke (1988) had implemented a similar approach.
Concentration in the UK salmon industry
The industry has undergone a process of consolidation over the last 20 years, since 1988 the 
number  of  active  companies  has  decreased  by  44%,  and  in  1999  15  companies  (of  95), 
accounted for 70% of Scottish production (SERAD 2000), (see Figure 1). In 1992, only 3% of 
production came from sites producing more than 1000 tonnes, but had risen to 59% in 1999. The 
number of firms actively producing salmon decreased to 69 firms in 2004 in comparison to 
132 in 1993; a decrease of over 45%. The trend showed continued concentration of salmon 
production in the hands of decreasing number of firms. Similar changes are occurring at the 
global  level  where  the  top  5  producers have  a  theoretical capacity of  800,000  tonnes  of 
salmon and trout (Intrafish 2002) which is the same amount as was produced in 1999. As 
consolidation occurs, and the average firm gets bigger, their role in the supply chain changes. 
Larger producers can take on more of the initial processing of the fish and integrate vertically.  
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Source: Source:  Annual Production Surveys 2004, Fisheries Research Services
Figure 1: Size and structure of the UK salmon farming industry5
The most important trends for the fish retailing subsector include the ‘one-stop shop’ culture 
associated with increasing supermarket dominance and the increasing demand for easy to 
prepare meals. Large supermarket chains have therefore been much more important in fish 
retail. The importance of supermarkets in fish sales is manifested by the concentration ratios 
for UK food retailing. According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), in 1988 the 
largest 5 supermarket chains in the UK accounted for only 32% of total fresh fish retail; by 
1995 this share had increased to 61%. Similarly, the top 10 only accounted for 36% of the 
total turnover for fresh fish in 1988, but by 1998 this had increased to 71%.  The market share 
of large supermarkets in the total retail sales has increased at the expense of the smaller 
retailers, mainly fishmongers. For example, the market share of fresh fish sold through large 
supermarket chains has increased from 16% of the market in 1988 to 86% in 2003. Over the 
same period, the market share of fishmongers and market stalls has declined to less than 17% 
and 13% of their respective numbers in 1988.  The overall picture of the UK retail market for 













































































Supermarkets Market stalls Mongers Other outlets
Source: Sea Fisheries Industry Authority
Figure 2: Household Purchase of Fresh Fish by Outlets in the UK, 1988 – 2003
As supermarkets grew, they have  exerted considerable influence over the processing and 
wholesale sectors, requiring them to meet strict health and safety regulations, packaging and 
processing requirements. Only larger processors or wholesalers have been able to install the 
infrastructure necessary to meet these requirements. As a result   processors, wholesalers and 
other marketing channel intermediaries have been pressured into mergers and consolidation 
to meet criteria set by supermarkets (Asche et al. 2003).
Theoretical framework
Assume that there are n (not necessarily symmetric) processing firms in the industry (indexed 
i = 1, 2. . . N) that produces a homogeneous product, salmon using M inputs. Also assume 
that firms use a quasi-fixed proportions technology in which there is a fixed proportional 
relationship between the material input (whole salmon) and the output (say salmon fillets), 
but that uses other nonmaterial inputs in variable proportions. 
Theoretically the behaviour of a firm is determined by its production technology and by the 
economic environment in which it operates, both of which act as constraints on the firm's 6
decision making process. Assume a profit maximisation for retailing is producing a retail 
good x using a homogenous technology   g ; the production function for the industry may be 
expressed as:
  j j j v q g x ,              (1)
where  j x is the output produced (fresh fillet, whole and smoked salmon);  j q  is the input 
from salmon wholesalers; and  j v  represents non-salmon inputs such as labour and capital. 
The function    g  is assumed to be a twice continuously differentiable production function.
In other word equation  (1) represents the underlying production function relationship for 
output j x . 
Furthermore, assume that the j
th retail firm exercises some market power in purchasing the 
salmon products from suppliers but acts as a price taker in all other input markets. Let the 
inverse market supply for salmon input be given by 
j j j rv wq c                         (2)
where  j q   and  j v   are  the  salmon  product  and  non-salmon  input  used  by  the  j
th firm 
respectively  and w and r are the respective prices. The problem of decision making of the j
th
salmon retailing firm is to choose inputs,  j q at prices so as to maximise profit j   subject to 
  j j j v q g x ,  :
j j j j rv wq px                    (3)
where  j x is the quantity of output produced by the j
th firm,  j q  is the quantity of input used by 
the  j
th  firm,  j v   is  a  vector  of  non-salmon  inputs  used  by  the  j
th  firm,    j j v q g ,   is  the 
underlying production function relationship for output  j x , while p and w are the prices of the 
output, salmon input respectively and r is a vector of and non-salmon inputs such as labour 
and capital. Equation (3) is an expression of the firm’s maximum level of profit (i.e., revenue 
minus total cost) that satisfies the properties of being positive (monotonicity), non-decreasing 
in p, non-increasing in w, and convex and continuous in p and w. Non-competitive behaviour 
is characterised by firms possessing some control in determining their input and/or output 











































p                   (4)
The mathematical  expression  on the left-hand  side  of  equation (4)  is  the  marginal  value 
product (MVP) for commodity input; while the term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is 
the salmon retail firm’s effective marginal cost (EMC). Using elasticity measures, equation 
















p 1 *             (5)
where  j  is  the  j
th  salmon  retailing  firm’s  conjectural  elasticity  in  the  salmon  wholesale 
commodity market,  is the price elasticity of supply of wholesale salmon.  j   shows the i
th
firm’s perception of the percentage change in the purchases by all firms in the industry in 7
reaction  to  a  1%  change  in  own  purchases.  Therefore  j    with  interval  [0,  1]  can  be 
interpreted  as  an  index  of  market  power  of  salmon  products  in  the  retail  market.  This 
parameter is comparable to Appelbaum's (1982) conjectural elasticity term for the output 
market. Chen and Lent (1992) refer to the right hand side of equation (5) as conjectural 
marginal  input  costs  (CMIC)  and  suggest  that  this  is  useful  for  detecting  the  degree  of 
monopsony/oligopsony power.
Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) also suggest that the ratio    j  be construed as an industry-
wide index of oligopsony power in the commodity market. The index represents the degree to 
which retail firm can set input price below the marginal product i.e., price mark-down. With 
observations for the firm commodity price, w; The CMIC can be estimated with knowledge 
of market elasticity,. In equation (5) if the index equal zero, a perfectly competitive market 
exists for the affected commodity. On the other hand if the index is not equal to zero, the 
commodity  market  is  not  perfectly  competitive.  With  a  little  bit  of  mathematical 
manipulations and with the rearrangement of equation (5), Hyde and Perloff (1994) write the 





















1           (6)
where   q   is the markdown. If 1  q  , the industry-wide index equals zero and the value of 
marginal  product  of  the  commodity  input  equals  the  farm  commodity  price.  If  on  the 
hand 1  q  , the index is not zero. Following Hyde and Perloff (1994), the expression for the 
oligopsonist  price  markdown  factor  from  equation  (6)  can  be  expressed  alternatively  as 
follows  j j q q x w p        and  multiplying  the  right  hand  side  by  q q x x    and 























q           (7)
In  elasticity  format  equation  (7)  can  be  written  as q q q     ;  where  x q q x q        
which is the firm’s elasticity of output with respect to the commodity input and   px wq q  
is the cost of the commodity input relative to value of supply.
Following Appelbaum  (1979)  we  incorporate  non-competitive  behaviour,  CMIC    q w 
into the profit function in to equation (3), then the profit function becomes:
  r w p j j q, , ,                            (8)
Notice that output price (p) and factor prices (w, r) and market power identification variable 
  q   are the parameters entering into profit-function. Basically the profit function in (8) maps 
particular factor prices to the maximum profit levels achievable at those output prices and 
factor prices. Taking partial derivatives with reference to choice variable (p) and (w), the first 
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           (10)8
where  j x is output supply function for  salmon retailer j;  j q is  salmon input demand. An 
assumption in the above formulation is that salmon retail firms in the industry are price takers 
in the output and input markets. Equations (9) and (10) represent salmon retailers’ output 
supply, and salmon input demand function respectively. The output supply and factor demand 
functions (9) and (10) are homogenous of degree zero in p and w, i.e., only relative price 
changes affect supply or demand. The second-order conditions of (3) are similar to (8) and 
are useful for validating (9) to (10). Specification of a functional form for equations (9) and 
(10)  allows  the  derivation  of  estimable  supply  and  demand  functions  to  test  for  the 
significance of  q   the price mark-down and for non-competitive behaviour or oligopsony 
power in the market for salmon products. 
The model specified so far is a firm level model. As is often the case in empirical work, firm 
level  data  are  difficult  to  obtain  due  to  confidentiality  problems.  Azzam  and  Pagoulatos 
(1990) highlighted that due to the lack of data on individual firm level, some assumptions 
must  be made to  enable  the aggregation  of firms  in  order to  perform  the analysis using 
industry level data. One possible assumption is to assume that in equilibrium, the market 
power  parameter  or  the  conjectural  elasticity  is  invariant  across  firms 
i.e.        n ...... 2 1 , so that all firms face identical marginal prices. The implication of 




    r q w p j , , ,  ). It is worth noting that the first and second order conditions that 
apply to firm level formulation also apply to the industry model.
Empirical specification
Empirical  econometric  models  usually  encounter  the  usual  problems  of  the  choice  of 
functional form of the theoretical model to apply. The choice of functional form for supply 
and demand functions or production technology, quasi-fixity of some inputs are among the 
problems to contend with. The problem is extenuated partially by using flexible function 
forms (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). Consequently, in some empirical studies, the production 
technology  is  often  represented  by  flexible  functional  forms  (translog  or  generalized 
Leontief), but supply and demand are usually represented by simple linear or double log 
functions.  Moreover,  Perloff  and  Shen  (2001)  demonstrated  that  linear  models  produced 
completely unreliable estimates on account of severe multicollinearity problems. 
Taking this into account we used the translog profit functional form (Christensen et al. 1975) 
and utilised the duality concept. According to duality theory, a production technology may be 
represented by a profit function which satisfies the following regularity properties: linear 
homogeneity,  monotonicity,  twice  continuous  differentiability  and  convexity  (Diewert, 
1974). 
Assuming a translog profit function, equation (3) can be specified as follows:
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Where the subscript x represents the output of salmon, q represents the salmon wholesale 
inputs of fresh fillet, smoked and whole salmon and v represents the non-salmon inputs.  For 9
empirical implementation, salmon products are assumed to be produced from aquaculture 
produced salmon.  Using Hotelling’s lemma and substituting for  q   partial differentiation of 
equation 3 with respect to salmon retailers short-run output supply,  x s , input demand,  q s , are 
obtained from equation (3) as:
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sx  is the value of output to total profit




sq  is the value of input to total profit
Theoretical properties of equations (12) and (13) follow directly from the properties of the 
profit function and require that the output supply and input demand functions exhibit adding-
up, homogeneity of degree zero and symmetry relationships, respectively, expressed as:
1   q x s s Adding up




xv xq xx l       Homogeneity
qx xq     Symmetry
While the above restrictions can be imposed on the parameters during estimation on the 
profit function, Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) argued that monotonicity and convexity are not 
general properties of the translog function and they can be imposed with linear restrictions on 
parameters in translog models.  Instead, the consistency of the estimated share equations with 
monotonicity and convexity properties must be evaluated after estimation.  To satisfy the 
monotonicity condition, the shares fitted from the estimated parameters must be positive.  
The implications are that salmon retailers do not accept negative profits if all inputs are 
perfectly variable and that input costs are not less than zero.  To be convex in prices, the 
Hessian implied by the estimated price parameters must be positive semi-definite (Chambers, 
1988; Fulginiti and Perrin 1993).  The implication is that for outputs, all own-price effects 
are positive and for inputs, all own-price effects are negative.  
In  addition,  oligopsony  behaviour  of  salmon  retailer  in  the  purchase  of  inputs  is  tested 
through estimation of the price “mark-down” (i.e. q q q     ).  Recall that  q   is now the 
retail industry’s elasticity of salmon outputs with respect to the industry’s inputs and  q   is 
the cost of the salmon retail industry input relative to the value of supply.  While q   can be 
derived from observed data as the input cost share of the value of the industry supply,  q   is 
unknown.    However  having  assumed  that  the  profit  function  satisfies  the  aggregation 
property,  the  production  technology  implied  is  quasi-homothetic  and  therefore  constant 
return to scale (Chambers, 1988).  That is production functions have expansion path that are 
straight  lines  that  do  not  necessarily  initiate  from  the  origin.    This  assumption  implies 
that 1  q  .    However,  following  Unterschultz  et  al.  (2000)  q  is  set  at  0.5  to  allow  the 10





























           (14)
Any changes in the price “mark-down”  q  will be ascribed to the ratio of the optimal shares 
of  the  value  of  output  and  the  value  of  input.    It  is  evident  from  the  above 
expression, 0    q q s  and 0    q x s  .  This  implies  that  a  higher  price  “markdown” 
results in a lower share of input and a higher share of the value of output.  Empirically, a 
statistically significant and positive estimate of the coefficient on  q  in the output equation 
and a statistically significant and negative estimate of the coefficient on  q  in the input 
equation  suggest  the  absence  of  oligopsony  power.  These  two  conditions  are  central  to 
detecting market power of salmon retailers.
The  dependent  variables  in  equations  (12)  and  (13)  are  shares  that  do  not  allow  easy 
interpretation  of  the  effects  of  prices  on  quantities  supplied.    In  this  case  retailers' 
responsiveness to price changes may be appropriately measured by elasticities.  The elasticity 
measures of interest are own-price elasticities of supply and demand as well as the elasticity 
of demand for inputs with respect to own-price "mark-down". The Marshallian output supply 
and  input  demand  elasticities  can  be  derived  from  the  profit  share  equations  as 
  x xx x xx S S       1 ,   
x xq q xq S S     for  all  x q  .  These  price  elasticities  are 
calculated at the sample means of the data.  Convexity of the profit function implies that the 
own-price elasticities are negative for inputs.
Data and dynamic ECM specification
Some of the data available for estimation were in monthly frequencies while others were in 
quarterly frequencies.  For consistency we follow Genesove and Mullin (1998) in aggregating 
up to quarterly level. Genesove and Mullin argued that this was to ensure that the estimated 
elasticity represents the long run elasticity as opposed to short run. In addition, the long run is 
considered because under imperfect competition, retailers are more likely to establish a price 
in  the  long-run  rather  than  short-run  profits  in  mind  and  to  maintain  that  price  for  a 
considerable period of time (Jumah 2004).  Therefore the data  available for estimation are 
defined as the average quarterly 1992-2004 time series for smoked 
it sx p , fillet 
it wx p  and 
whole   
it sx p salmon  for  retail  and  smoked 
it sq p ,  fillet 
it wq p   and  whole   
it sq p salmon 
wholesale prices, wage  qt xt w w ,  in the food wholesaling sector, private sector investment 
indices  kvq kvx r r ,   for  food  and  alcoholic  beverages  and  the  generated  identification  price 
mark-down variable,    q  .  The data on retail prices were obtained from Sea Fish Industry 
Authority (SFIA), while wholesale price were obtained from Scottish Quality (SQS).  Wage 
index of food wholesalers and the index of private sector investment in food and alcoholic 
beverages were obtained from the Office for National Statistics. 
We examined the order of integration of all the variables by applying the unit root tests. We 
applied the ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979). The ADF tests the null of no unit root in the data 
against the alternative of a unit root. Table 1 reports the outcome of the for the ADF tests. 
The tests results indicate that all variables are non-stationary in level but stationary in first 11
differences.  Overall, the conclusion drawn was that all the level variables are integrated of 
order one, I(1); a necessary condition for cointegration. 





















-2.39 -2.40 -4.61* -4.47* 66.74* 236.9*
x s3
-2.33 -2.27 10.47* -7.82* 57.74** 221.1*
q s1
-0.54 -1.93 -10.88* -9.52* 60.26** 229.0*
q s2
-1.03 -1.23 -9.57
* -9.55* 44.69 202.9**
q s3
-2.78 -1.59 -2.52 -4.39* 58.39** 229.0*
xq 1  -1.60 -1.62 -3.15** -3.38
xq 2  -2.12 -1.71 -3.08** -3.45
xq 3  -1.78 -1.43 -6.74* -6.05*
qx 1  -1.98 -2.79 -9.11* -8.47*
qx 2  -1.43 -1.93 -6.36* -6.36*
qx 3  -2.81 -1.99 -6.34
* -6.61*
inv r -2.16 -1.02 -9.04* -9.75*
wages r -1.14 -1.48 -5.11* -5.07*
q  -2.79 -2.78 -6.72* -6.72*
q  -1.59 -2.80 -5.45* -5.38*
q  -1.49 -2.31 -3.39** 3.42
*significant at 1% level,     **significant at 5%.
Having identified the order of integration in the individual data series, the next step was to 
investigate whether or not there is a linear relationship among the variables of interest which 
are  integrated  of  order  one;  if  this  is  such  a  relationship,  the  variables  are  said  to  be 
cointegrated and an equilibrium relationship exists.  Since the model contains more than two 
variables, the maximum likelihood method of Johansen (1988) was used to determine the 
distinct  cointegrating  relationships  which  exist  among  the  variables  in  both  the  derive 
demand and the output supply equations.  For each share equation both the trace and the 
maximum eigenvalue test are reported in Table 1. Both tests reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration vectors since the value of the tests for r = 0 is greater than the critical values at 12
the 95% level.  In addition, the tests suggest that there is at least one cointegrating vector.
1  It 
therefore  follows  that  the  variables  are  cointegrated  and  that  an  equilibrium  relationship 
exists which can be analysed using an Error Correction Model (ECM).
The estimation of the economic models involving integrated data has been addressed using a 
number of methods. Ng (1995) specifically considers the issue of testing the homogeneity 
restriction and uses a method in which the empirical distribution of the relevant test statistics 
are simulated by parameterising the data generating process and using this as the basis for a 
Monte Carlo exercise.  Attfield (1997) uses the triangular error correction model (TECM) of 
Phillips (1991), and in considering the theoretically implied restrictions also focuses only on 
the homogeneity restriction. Reziti and Ozanne (1999) estimated ECM of Greek agriculture 
output andinput share equations derived from a translog profit function using aggregate level 
data.  Nested within this model are both a conventional static model (STM) and three simpler 
dynamic models: a partial adjustment model (PAM), autoregressive error model (AEM) and 
finite  distributed  lag  model  (FDLM).    Reziti  and  Ozanne  adopted  a  sequential  testing 
procedure to find the model which best represents the underlying data generation process.  
Their result indicated that the data-generating process rejects the static model and simpler 
dynamic modelsin favour of the more general error correction model. 
Consequently  we  used  the  more  general  Anderson  and  Blundell  (1982)  technique  as 
exemplified by Asche et al. (1997).  We assumed the data generation process follows the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) models for reparametisation of the models used in 
this paper.  The ADL model is an extremely flexible model for time series data, and is often 
seen in the following bivariate form.  This can be written more compactly in vector matrix 
notation as follows:
t x y t               (15)
where  t y is a n-vector of budget shares;  t x is a k-vector of intercept, own price, price of other 
salmon products and  expenditure variables; and  is the (n×k) matrix of long-run AIDS 
parameters. Equation (15) represents the long-run, equilibrium position.  In the short-run, 
after changes in any of the elements of t x , the system may be ‘out of equilibrium’ for some 
periods as full adjustment to the equilibrium is delayed by inertia that is due to transaction 
costs, habits and imperfect information.  However, the systems of equations as a whole may 
be classified as ‘cointegrating’ if any such disequilibrium diminishes towards zero for all 
products over time.  This  dynamic process of adjustment  may be modelled by a vector-
autoregressive, distributed lag (VARDL(r, q)) model:
    t ε x L Γ y L B t t                                                                                       (16)














* L Γ L Γ
where B(L) and (L) are matrix polynomials of orders r and q, respectively, in the lag operator 
L, and  t ε is an independent, identically distributed random disturbance vector. In practice, 
estimation is simplified if the orders of the polynomials are identical,  q r  .  Determining the 
value of q is often accomplished by estimating an initial, relatively high-order VARDL, then 
testing down for shorter maximum lags in an attempt to obtain a parsimonious, but data-
                                                
1Note that the max test rejected cointegration for the input demand equation for fillets but trace test indicated a 
cointegration relationship.13
consistent  model.    Since  researchers  have  often  found  that  relatively  low-order  vector-
autoregressive  models  will  generally  suffice  in  cointegration  analysis  of  seasonally 
unadjusted data (Johansen, 1995), the decision was taken to carry out all estimation and 
inference within the context of a relatively parsimonious, first-order VARDL (q = 1).
Given that the inverse exists, the longrun structure implied by equation (16) is shown as 
follows.
























* 1 * Γ B 1 Γ 1 B θ Π
                                                                 (17)
Equation (17) can be reparameterised to give an observationally equivalent set of equation of 
the form:
                    t ε q t x 1 Γ p t y 1 B t x Δ L Γ t Δw L B t Δy
* *         ~                   (18)
Where the tilde indicates that the column for the most constant term has been deleted as the 
dependent variable vector in both the AIDS and tranlog models adds up to unity.  In the 
AIDS and translog models developed in the next section, it should be noted that the vector 
  t y would correspond to the expenditure and profit shares respectively.  The adding up 
restriction linked with equations (17) and (18) are:
, 1 ,.... 1 ,
' '    p i m i B i i i , 1 ,....... 0 , 0 '     q i i i   ' 1 '
* ki B i 
  0 ....... 0 0 1 '   i    , 0 ..... 0 0 1 1 '
*    k i
The  covariance  matrix  of  the  equation  system  in  (18)  is  singular  due  to  the  adding  up 
conditions.  As a result the system has a potential redundant variable  problem since the 
vectors  of  the  lagged  dependent  variables  that  sum  to  unity  appear  in  each  equation.  
Anderson and Blundell (1982) solved this problem by deleting one variable in the dependent 
variable vector, which also implies that the last column is subtracted from the other columns 
in each 
*
i B matrix.  The covariance matrix of the system equations in (18) is still singular as 
the left-hand side of the equation sums to zero.  As a result one equation is dropped before 
estimation  of  the  model.    The  invariance  property  to  which  equation  to  be  deleted  also 
applies in this type of systems.  Letting the subscript on a matrix denote the deletion of the 
last row and a superscript denote a    1  n n  dimensional matrix, the system to be estimated is 
then:






n n         ~    (19)
All  the  parameters  in  (18)  may  be  retrieved  from  (19)  using  the  adding  up  conditions. 
Equation (19) provides a template for re-parametising a dynamic ECM Translog models as 
follows
t ixv iqt ixq t xq ixqt ixq ixxt ixx ixt i ix ix r w p p s s                ln ln ln ln ln * 1        
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t iqv q qx t iqq iqxt iqx iqqt iqq iq t i q r w p p s s                ln ln ln ln ln [ * 1        
           2 1 1 1 1 1 ln ln ln ln ln ln                 ixqt ixq t qv iqt iqx it iqq ixqt ixq iqqt iqq p r w p p       
          it ik
3
1 k
ik 2 2 2 2 s ] ln ln ln ln                
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    t qv qt iqx it qq iqqt iqq r w p      (21)
where it  ,  ik s   and  are the error terms, quarterly dummy variables and parameter to be 
estimated  in  the  demand  and  supply  equation  respectively.    The  inclusion  of  seasonal 
dummies  is  based  on  previous  salmon  demand  and  supply  studies,  which  indicate  that 
seasonality is important in the industry (Steen et al. 1999 Asche et al. 2004).  All other 
variables in  equations (20)  and (21) are as defined  previously.  The specification  of the 
equation (21) means that retailers’ demand for input does not only depend on its own price 
but also on the price of the product at retail level. For the supply equation (21) the supply of 
salmon product at retail level does not only depend on its own price, but also on the price of 
the product at wholesale level.
Empirical results
The  determination  of  oligopsony  power  of  salmon  retailers  involved  the  simultaneous 
estimation of the ECM translog input derived demand and output supply models, that is 
equations (20) and (21) respectively.  Input prices, output prices and all nominal variables 
were  deflated  by  the  consumer  price  index.    This  implicitly  imposes  the  homogeneity 
property in the supply and demand functions.  Symmetry conditions are imposed during the 
estimation procedure.  The systems of two input-derived demand and supply equations for 
smoked and fillet salmon products were estimated simultaneously using Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) procedure (Zellner, 1962).  The third equation for whole salmon from 
each system was deleted because of singularity of the variance matrix for all four equations, 
and  parameters  of  that  equation  were  obtained  through  the  homogeneity  and  symmetry 
restrictions.  By iterating over both the parameters and the error variance-covariance matrix, 
the  estimates  obtained  are  invariant  to  the  equation  chosen  for  deletion  (Barten,  1969).  
Seasonality was taken into account by using quarterly seasonal dummies, S1, S2, and S3. 
Lagging  the  dependent  share  equations  by  one  period  was  sufficient  to  get  rid  of  any 
autocorrelation problems
Since the parameters are first and second order logarithmic derivatives of the profit function 
evaluated at the approximation point, economic theory provides no prior expectations about 
their signs (Weaver, 1983). The validation of the models must rely on the overall fit of the 
system;  on  significance  of  the  coefficients;  and  on  whether  or  not  the  estimated  profit 
function satisfies the monotonicity, convexity, and symmetry conditions. While the properties 
of homogeneity and symmetry were imposed, monotonicity was tested using the estimated 
parameters to predict shares at each data point.  The monotonicity property is satisfied when 
predicted  shares  are  positive  at  each  data  point.    For  convexity  in  prices,  all  own-price 
elasticities should have the expected signs; that is, positive for output supply and negative for 
input demand (Chambers, 1988).  
The preliminary estimates of the parameter from the systems of equations for output supply 
and input derived demand are reported in the Appendix in Tables A1 and A2 respectively.
The Appendix also provides a brief analysis of the results of the unrestricted model. In all, 
the diagnostics of the model in terms of
2 R , variance of the models for the value added 
products  are  within  acceptable  ranges.    However,  few  parameter  estimates  from  the 15
unrestricted models are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels. Notably,  the models 
violated the monotonicity, concavity and convexity conditions implied by economic theory.  
In addition the elasticities estimated from these models were also of the wrong signs.  To be 
consistent with the behavioural postulates of economic theory, the estimated models must 
satisfy all or at least most of the properties of a well-behaved profit function which result 
from profit maximisation hypotheses.  Therefore this problem must be fixed to improve the 
predictive power of the models.  This paper uses Bayesian approach to impose restrictions.
Imposing restrictions using the Bayesian approach
The objective is to obtain consistent index of retailers’ oligopsony power for the three value 
added  products  of  salmon.    To  be  able  to  do  this  the  estimated  model  should  exhibit 
comparative-static regularities following from economic theory. A widely applied solution to 
the problem is the imposition of regularity conditions globally
2, i.e. impose restrictions on all 
values of the regressor space (see Diewert and Wales 1987).  For most flexible functional 
forms, however, such restrictions come at the cost of limiting the flexibility with regard to 
representing  other  economic  relationships.    For  example,  under  the  imposition  of  global 
concavity, the cost functions do not allow for complementary relationships among inputs.  
Kleit and Terrell (2001) argued that global restrictions also causes the translog models to 
overestimate own-price elasticities and also biases price elasticities.
Barnett (2002) and Barnett and Pausaupathy (2003) argued that the ‘monotonicity’ regularity 
condition has been mostly disregarded in estimation, leading to questionable interpretability 
of  the  resultant  empirical  economic  models.    A  fundamental  difficulty,  however,  is  that 
imposing both curvature and monotonicity can dilute the property of second order flexibility.  
For the special case of finite linear-in-the-parameters functional forms, which is the most 
common in empirical applications, Lau (1978) proved that flexibility is incompatible with 
global regularity if both concavity and monotonicity are imposed.  Thus, maintaining higher 
order  flexibility  requires  giving  up  global  regularity  in  favour  of  imposing  restrictions 
locally.
The local approach maintains the flexibility property of a functional form if the regularity 
conditions are imposed at one selected point of the regressor space (Ryan and Wales 1998). 
The risk with this approach is that regularity may be violated in a neighbourhood of this 
selected  point.    Because  of  this  dilemma,  the  literature  on  flexible  functional  forms  is 
characterised by a continual investigation for new functional forms that produce relatively 
large regular regions. Nonetheless, for a given data set, searching for alternate forms and 
applying and testing the regularity conditions on a case by case basis becomes an arduous 
task,  that can also be rife with statistical testing/verification problems.  In order to maintain 
flexibility involves the imposition of regularity conditions locally, Gallant and Golub (1984) 
proposed  an  inequality  constrained  optimisation  program  to  impose  regularity  conditions 
locally  at  each  observed  regressor  value.    This  methodology  was  further  expounded  by 
Griffith (1988) and applied by numerous authors including Terrell (1996), Chalfant, Gray 
and White (1991).  Compared with the global approach, this method generally increases the 
fit of the model to the data.  This study follows the local approach of imposing restrictions 
using Bayesian approach to achieve monotonicity and concavity.  These constraints were 
imposed only over the region of the ECM derived input demand and output supply equation 
where inference was drawn. 
                                                
2 It is possible to impose global curvature restrictions, for example, using eigenvalue decomposition methods 
and methods involving Cholesky factorisation (e.g. see Coelli, and  Perelman , 1996).16
As already discussed homogeneity is implied by working with real prices while symmetry 
conditions are imposed.  These restrictions from theory represent prior information that can 
be imposed on flexible forms through equality restrictions on the parameters.  Chalfant et al. 
(1991) highlighted that such restrictions reduce the dimensionality of the parameter space 
when systems of equations based on these forms are estimated.  For example homogeneity 
and symmetry provide considerable gains in degrees of freedom.  Prior information taking 
the form of an inequality restriction is less informative than such equality restrictions, in the 
sense that this information serves to truncate the parameter space, rather than reduce the 
number of free parameters.  Conventional approaches to estimation do not permit the formal 
inclusion of such information (Judge et al. 1988). Chalfant et al. (1991) argued that the 
problem of prior beliefs that take the form of inequality constraints is easily handled in the
context of Bayesian inference.
3
To describe the method, a data generating process was first assumed.  It was also assumed 
that  input  and output  prices may be treated as  exogenous, so  that  the  parameters of the 
system of  1  n  equations for profit shares could be estimated using seemingly unrelated 
regressions  (SUR).    As  is  well  known,  the  equation  for  the  nth  profit  share  cannot  be 
included without implying a singular contemporaneous covariance matrix for the error terms 
in the n share equations (Barten 1969). But deleting the nth share and using restrictions on 
the parameters allows the complete set of parameter estimates to be obtained.  Use of iterated 
SUR was shown by Barten to lead to maximum-likelihood estimates that are invariant to the 
equation chosen for deletion.  It is assumed that each time period's n-1 vector of errors, and 
therefore the vector of profit shares, follows the multivariate normal distribution. 
Using the Bayesian procedure as outlined by Griffiths (1988), Chalfant et al. (1991) suggest 
that the probability that the basic idea is to compute Bayes estimates as the mean of truncated 
multivariate  t-posterior.  For  instance  let  us  assume  the  parameter  estimates   ˆ   with  a 
variance-covariance estimate   . ˆ  V distribution.  Empirical implementation of the Bayesian 
approach involves  the  use  of  Monte  Carlo  numerical  integration  that  is  implemented  by 
generating replication from multivariate t- distribution.  At each replication i the vector  i w  is 
drawn from a       ˆ , 0 V N  and draws another vector  i z from a 
2  distribution with say, v
degrees  of  freedom.    This  procedure  was  followed  to  obtain  a  sample  size  of  500,000 
replications  (including  antithetic  replications)  from  the  multivariate  t-distribution  with  6 
restrictions which is also equivalent to the degrees of freedom. 
Results and theoretical validation of the constrained models
In all, four equations were estimated, that is two equations each from the derived demand and 
supply functions. The parameter estimates, their standard error are given in Tables 2 and 3 for 
the constrained output supply equation and input demand equation respectively.
Table 2: Constrained results of the output supply
                                                
3 See Griffiths (1988), Chalfant, Gray and White (1991) for an excellent introduction to inequality restrictions in 
the Bayesian framework.17
Smoke Fillet




1 1   xt s -0.0952* 0.0004 -0.0298
* 0.0006
xxt p1 ln 0.0289* 0.0004 -0.0344
* 0.0005
xqt p1 ln 0.0057* 0.0003 -0.0066* 0.0003
invt r  ln -0.1713* 0.0008 0.1679* 0.0010
wagest r  ln -0.1780* 0.0011 0.0957* 0.0013
iqt   ln 0.0796* 0.0002 0.0085* 0.0001
1 1 ln   xxt p 0.0854* 0.0004 -0.0519* 0.0005
1 1 ln   xqt p 0.0236* 0.0003 0.0192* 0.0003
1 ln   invt r -0.1993* 0.0008 0.0935* 0.0010
1 ln   wagest r 0.2014* 0.0011 -0.3446* 0.0013
1 ln   iqt  0.0356* 0.0002 -0.0055* 0.0001
2 1 ln  xxt p 0.312* 0.0001 0.338* 0.0001
2 1 ln  xqt p -0.0111* 0.0001 -0.0141* 0.0001
2 ln  invt r 0.0122* 0.0004 0.0168
* 0.0005
2 ln  wagest r -0.0266* 0.0006 -0.0067* 0.0008
2 ln  iqt  0.0078* 0.0002 0.0097* 0.0001
S2
-0.0695* 0.0003 0.0183* 0.0003
S3
0.0181* 0.0004 -0.0347* 0.0004
S4
0.1826* 0.0003 -0.1657* 0.0004
* significant at 1% level
Table 3: Constrained results of the input derived demand18
Smoke Fillet




1 1   qt s -0.0615
* 0.0005 0.0160
* 0.0002
qqt p1 ln -0.0016
* 0.0004 -0.0062
* 0.0002
qxt p1 ln -0.0131
* 0.0003 -0.0126
* 0.0001
invt r  ln -0.0486
* 0.0008 0.0541
* 0.0003
wagest r  ln -0.1442
* 0.0012 -0.0102
* 0.0004
iqt   ln -0.1258
* 0.0002 -0.0397
* 0.0000
1 1 ln   qqt p 0.0305
* 0.0004 0.0020
* 0.0002
1 1 ln   qxt p -0.0120
* 0.0003 -0.0016
* 0.0001
1 ln   invt r -0.1209
* 0.0008 0.0441
* 0.0003
1 ln   wagest r 0.0973
* 0.0011 -0.0639
* 0.0004
1 ln   iqt  -0.0353
* 0.0005 0.0143
* 0.0002
2 1 ln  qqt p 0.0119
* 0.0001 0.0138
* 0.0001
2 1 ln  qxt p -0.311
* 0.0001 -0.241
* 0.0001
2 ln  invt r 0.0172
* 0.0004 0.0157
* 0.0002
2 ln  wagest r -0.0330
* 0.0006 -0.0216
* 0.0003














* significant at 1% level
Not surprisingly, given the estimation technique employed here, nearly all of the parameters 
estimates appear to be significantly different from zero.
The intuition of imposing constraints on the models is better understood by checking whether 
the model satisfies the theoretical properties of the function from which it is derived.
Homogeneity and symmetry were imposed in the estimation process but monotonicity and 
convexity were not.  Most of the predicted shares are positive implying that the translog 
profit function largely satisfies the property of monotonicity.  In an economic sense, this 
implies there are no negative profits for salmon when inputs are perfectly variable.  The 
property of convexity in prices was ascertained by the sign of the estimated demand and 
supply elasticities.
4 The own price derived demand elasticities for smoked and fillets are -
0.24 (0.0001) and -0.31 (0.162) respectively while the own price supply elasticities are 0.12 
(0.0002)  and  0.27  (0.003)  for  smoke  and  fillets  respectively.
5 A  convex  profit  function 
                                                
4Convexity requires that all eigen values of the sub-matrix of estimated price coefficients be non-negative and 
that at least one should be zero for positive semi-definiteness.  The price coefficients of the longrun parameters 
in each equation were used to estimate eigen values. The eigen value tests for both input demand and output 
supply largely satisfy the condition for positive semi-definiteness.  
5 Standard error in parenthesis.19
implies that retailers can always keep output and cost constant but still increase profit with an 
increase  in  output  price.  This  is  the  first  study  that  estimates  the  demand  and  supply 
elasticities for salmon retailers in the UK so comparison cannot be made with any other 
study. 
Although  the  aforementioned  discussion  of  the  empirical  results  is  insightful,  a  key 
component of any market power study are the conduct market power parameters attached to 
2 ln  iqt  , an equivalent of price “mark-down” which are reported in Tables 2 and 3.  The 
estimated mark-down parameters from the supply and derived demand equations for smoke 
salmon are 0.0078 and -0.0028 respectively; while the markdown parameters from the supply 
and derived demand equation for salmon fillets are 0.0097 and -0.0003 respectively.  While 
the estimated parameter is statistically significant, the estimated parameters are sufficiently 
closer to zero to conclude that retailers do not have oligopsony power over their suppliers.  A 
possible explanation for this finding is that retailers as a whole behaved competitively during 
much or most of the period covered by this study.  This possibility seems likely, especially 
when  one  considers  that  oligopsony  power  is  very  small  in  several  studies  of  similarly 
concentrated agricultural product retailing sector. In this regard, the results are largely in 
agreement  with  those  of  other  studies  that  have  analysed  the  competitiveness  of  salmon 
markets (see Asche et al. 2006).  However, it should be noted, that the results obtained in this 
paper should not be taken as evidence that the UK retail markets for salmon products are 
competitive.    It  could  be  the  case,  for  instance,  that  salmon  retail  firms  did  engaged in 
anticompetitive  conduct  as  industry  concentration  increased,  but  that  the  information 
contained in the data is not sufficiently strong to detect such conduct using the empirical 
methods employed.  Nevertheless, the signs on the parameters and the statistical significance 
of the parameters appear to suggest that there was a limited ability or potential for retailers to 
exert some oligopsony power in the market for the smoked salmon and salmon fillet. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Salmon products have now become affordable to the ordinary consumer despite the highly 
concentrated channels by which the supplies are obtained.  In order to gain an understanding 
of the transformation of the retail sector for salmon products, we develop economic models 
of  firm  conduct  based  on  the  empirical  industrial  organisation  literature to  determine 
oligopsony  power  of  salmon  retailers  in  the  UK  domestic  market.    Three  value-added 
products of salmon were examined; the smoked, fillet and whole salmon.
In the determination of oligopsony power of salmon retailers, the translog profit function for 
each value-added product was specified as an ECM translog functional form and one output 
supply and one factor demand models were estimated for each of the three product forms.   
Initial  estimation  of  the  models  violated  behavioural  conditions  of  monotonicity  and 
convexity  in  prices  implied  in  economic  theory.    To  be  consistent  with  the  behavioural 
postulates of economic theory, a Bayesian technique was used to constrain the models by 
imposing local inequality restrictions on some parameters to improve the predictive power of 
the models.  The constrained model estimates differ from the unconstrained  estimates in 
several respects; the signs and magnitudes of coefficients and elasticities associated with the 
salmon  products  underwent  noticeable  change.    The  mark-down  price  parameters  in  the 
equation  indicate  that  retailers  do  not  have  oligopsony  power  over  their  suppliers.  
Nevertheless, the signs on the parameters and the statistical significance of the parameters 
appear to suggest that there was a limited ability or potential for retailers to exert some 
oligopsony power in the market for the smoked salmon and salmon fillet. However, it is also 20
appropriate to  state the  estimates in  this  paper  should  be treated with  some caution due 
uncertainties inherent in some of the data used.  For instance, the cost of labour for food 
manufacturing was used instead of labour in fish processing due to inaccessibility of the 
latter.
An important limitation of this paper and others analysing oligopsony market power in the 
salmon  industry  is  the  absence  of  product  differentiation  and  market  segmentation.  By 
estimating a model assuming commodity homogenous products, this study is ignoring the 
rapid  change  of  UK.  Retailers  are  expanding  their  production  operations  to  include  the 
production of pre-packed and ready-to-eat salmon meals via differentiation strategies such as 
branding. However, the degree of product differentiation is relatively unknown and data are 
sparse which further exacerbates the difficulties of researching in this area.21
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Appendix 
Table A1: Unconstrained results of the output supply





ix  (Constant) 0.000 0.026 -0.020 0.033
1 1   xt s -0.089** 0.039 -0.035 0.048
xxt p1 ln 0.013 0.032 -0.050 0.045
xqt p1 ln 0.012 0.022 -0.004 0.026
invt r  ln -0.187* 0.067 0.170** 0.083
wagest r  ln -0.129 0.099 0.103 0.117
iqt   ln 0.086* 0.015 0.009 0.011
1 1 ln   xxt p 0.081** 0.036 -0.068** 0.045
1 1 ln   xqt p 0.049** 0.026 0.030 0.030
1 ln   invt r -0.218* 0.067 0.097 0.083
1 ln   wagest r 0.250* 0.096 -0.337* 0.116
1 ln   iqt  0.049* 0.018 -0.006 0.011
2 1 ln  xxt p -0.004 0.012 -0.001 0.017
2 1 ln  xqt p 0.033 *** 0.023 -0.001 0.015
2 ln  invt r -0.026 0.039 0.006 0.045
2 ln  wagest r 0.019 0.055 0.011 0.070
2 ln  iqt  0.027*** 0.018 -0.006 0.009
S2
-0.068* 0.027 0.023 0.030
S3
0.019 0.031 -0.032 0.034
S4
0.187* 0.027 -0.164* 0.031
R
2 0.88 0.77
2  0.0010 0.0016
*significant at 1% level,; 
** significant at 5% level;  *** significant at 10% level25
Table A2: Unconstrained results of the input derived demand
Share Equation Smoke Fillet




iq  (Constant) 0.006 0.027 -0.007 0.009
1 1   qt s -0.055 0.045 0.015 0.017
qqt p1 ln -0.017 0.036 -0.012 0.016
qxt p1 ln -0.007 0.027 -0.007 0.012
invt r  ln -0.063 0.069 0.054 ** 0.023
wagest r  ln -0.094 0.102 -0.003 0.033
iqt   ln -0.120* 0.018 -0.039* 0.004
1 1 ln   qqt p 0.024 0.039 -0.006 0.018
1 1 ln   qxt p 0.014 0.030 0.007 0.014
1 ln   invt r -0.140** 0.069 0.043 0.023
1 ln   wagest r 0.147
*** 0.099 -0.057 ** 0.033
1 ln   iqt  -0.016 0.043 0.013 0.017
2 1 ln  qqt p -0.004 0.012 -0.001 0.017
2 1 ln  qxt p 0.033
*** 0.023 -0.001 0.015
2 ln  invt r -0.020 0.039 0.003 0.019
2 ln  wagest r 0.012 0.056 0.001 0.031
2 ln  iqt  0.015 0.021 0.002 0.004
S2
-0.050 ** 0.029 0.001 0.009
S3
0.002 0.034 -0.022 ** 0.010
S4
0.121* 0.030 -0.027* 0.009
R
2 0.92 0.87
2  0.001 0.0001
* significant at 1% level,; **significant at 5% level; *** significant at 10% level
The 
2 R  values for individual equation are quite good.  The  
2 R  for the  output supply 
equation were 0.88 and 0.77 for smoke and fillet respectively, and  few  parameters 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels. For the input derived 
demand equation, the 
2 R  statistics were 0.92 and 0.87. Like the output supply model, 
the significant estimated parameters in the input demand model are few. The LM 
statistic values are measures of first-order serial correlation in the estimated models.  
The  computed  LM 
2  statistic  values  obtained  for  the  input  demand  for  smoke 
salmon and salmon fillet are 4.74 and 0.95 respectively.  For the output supply, the 
computed  LM
2  statistic  values obtained for smoke salmon  and salmon  fillet are 
1.99 and 0.75 respectively.  Comparing the tabulated critical statistics of 5.99 for 2 
degrees  of  freedom  with  the  computed  statistics  for  both  input  demand  and  out 26
demand equations suggest that serial correlation is not a problem in the models.  The 
variance of the estimates 
2  , which is a measure of the difference between observed 
variation and predicted variation in the shares equations, is also used to validate the 
models.  Variance estimate for smoke salmon input demand equation is 0.001 and 
while the variance for whole salmon input demand equation is 0.0001.  In the out 
supply  equation  variances  are  0.001  and  0.002  for  smoke  and  salmon  fillet 
respectively.  Low variance estimates are indications of good predictive abilities of 
estimated models.